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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
STEPHEN LAINE WELLS,

Case No. 950773-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
In an effort to justify a specifically tailored warrantless
search of areas in Defendant/Appellant Stephen Wells' ("Wells")
home, the state has advanced two theories: First, the state asserts
the warrantless search was proper under the federal and state
constitutions as "incident to [Wells'] arrest"; second, the state
asserts Wells failed to properly marshal evidence and preserve
issues

relevant

justification"

to

the

"alternative

for the search.

Neither

exigent

circumstances

theory

is capable of

legitimating the activities of the officers in this instance.
Although the state called witnesses to testify in two separate
hearings in the trial court, the state cannot, and has not, identified a single fact to support the determination that the areas
searched were within Wells' "immediate control" or that the search
was closely related in time to the arrest (s).

In addition, the

state fails to prove that exigent circumstances existed to justify
the warrantless search.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE MARSHALED FACTS AND INFERENCES DO NOT
SUPPORT JUSTIFYING THE SEARCH AS "INCIDENT TO ARREST."
1

In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
States

Supreme

Court

ruled

that

a person's

(1969), the United
home

may

not

be

subjected to a warrantless search merely because he happens to be
arrested

there.

It

is, however, reasonable

for an

arresting

officer to search the area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items, i.e. the area within
the arrestee's "immediate control."

Id. at 763.

The warrantless

search of areas in a home incident to arrest is justified if the
state can show that certain temporal and geographical factors and
exigent circumstances existed at the time of the arrest.

Id. at

764; see also, Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819-20 (1969)
(disavowing residential

search as "incident to arrest" where it was

not confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest) ; Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970); State v. Hycrh, 711 P.2d 264, 272
n. 2 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (limiting warrantless
search to "an area within which a suspect could reasonably be
expected to grab a weapon or destroy evidence"); State v. Ricks,
816 P.2d 125, 128 (Alaska 1991) (a search remote in time or place
from arrest cannot be justified); (Appellee's Brief at 8 ) .
In connection with the state's claim that the officers' search
of Wells' home was "incident to arrest," the state ignores the
exigency factor and disregards the lack of evidence concerning
"immediate control" and temporal proximity.

After two evidentiary

hearings in the trial court on the matter, the state's witnesses
presented testimony reflecting the following:
Wells and his house-mate, Kelly Jensen ("Jensen"),
resided in the basement apartment of a split level home.
2

(R. 54, 56, 62, 66-67; cited in Appellee's Brief at 9.)
Four officers crashed through glass doors of the upperlevel dwelling, went down to the basement apartment, and
arrested and handcuffed Wells immediately at the bottom
of the stairs. (R. 65.) At the time officers handcuffed
and arrested Wells, Jensen was in a closet in a "back
room" of the basement apartment. (R. 65.)
Officers were assured immediately after Wells and Jensen
were handcuffed, or contemporaneous therewith (see notes
5 and 9, infra), that "there wasn't anybody else in that
entire house." "The house was empty."
(R. 66, 164).
After officers found Jensen in the closet and arrested
her, they moved her to another room and interrogated her.
(R. 148-51 (Officer Gary Sterner ("Sterner") testified
that he guarded Jensen and had discussions with her, and
asked her "where the cocaine was").) In response to the
questions, Jensen told officers about cocaine in the slit
of a jacket lining and marijuana in a vacuum cleaner.1

1

The state asserts that " [b]ecause the marijuana charge, which was
based on the marijuana recovered from the vacuum cleaner and bed [sic] ,
was dismissed pursuant to the parties [sic] plea agreement . . ., the
State narrows its response solely to the justification for the seizure
of cocaine from defendant's jacket which is the basis for the conviction
on appeal." (Appellee's Brief at 6 n.l.) However, in this matter, the
conditional plea agreement was made pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P. 2d
935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Rule ll(i), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Rule 11 (i) states:
With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution,
a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and
mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the
right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse
determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant
who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
The trial court approved and the prosecution consented to appellate
review of the issues specifically raised in the pre-trial Motion to
Suppress (R. 100-06), including review of the legality of the warrantless
search of the vacuum cleaner. Pursuant to Rule 11 (i) , Serv, and the plea
agreement (R. 100), in the event Wells prevails on appeal, he may
withdraw the plea. If he does so, the original charges (including the
marijuana charge) will again be pending. Thus, Wells will be in the same
position he was before the plea was entered, except that he and the state
will have final appellate resolution on the pre-trial Motion to Suppress.
A failure to reach the issue of whether the trial court erroneously
denied the Motion to Suppress as it related to the warrantless search of
the vacuum would deprive Wells of the benefit of a determination of that
issue on appeal, as promised and guaranteed by the conditional plea
bargain.
In addition, it would constitute a breach of the plea
agreement, providing Wells with grounds to withdraw the conditional plea,
3

(R. 50.)
Jensen's statements to officers took place
"while Wells was present." (R. 51, 56; cited in
Appellee's Brief at 9.)
The officers conducted a second search that was narrower
in scope than the prior sweep search.
The officers
focused on the areas identified by Jensen: the jacket
lining and vacuum cleaner. (R. 52-53.)
Prior to the search of the jacket lining and vacuum
cleaner, Jensen was in handcuffs and in officer custody
in a bedroom (R. 14 8) , the vacuum cleaner was located in
a living room area (R. 150-51) , and the jacket was
located "on a bed" in a separate room in the basementlevel apartment. (R. 66.) Jensen "took [Officer Russo]
into the room" where the jacket was located. (R. 53.) 2
Russo testified that when he searched the vacuum cleaner
and assisted Sterner in searching the jacket lining, he
was not sure where Wells was, but that he was in the
basement, which had adjoining rooms. (See R. 53, 67.)
During the specifically tailored search, Wells was
already arrested, handcuffed and in custody. (R. 65.)
According to the facts and inferences, the officers did not conduct
the specifically tailored search contemporaneous with or in the
and would render this entire appellate process useless.
Because the plea agreement concerns appeal of the issues
specifically identified in the pre-trial Motion to Suppress, Wells has
addressed the search of the vacuum cleaner. Since the state has failed
to rebut the presumption that the search was unconstitutional, the trial
court's ruling on that issue should be summarily reversed and an order
entered granting the pre-trial Motion as it relates to the vacuum
cleaner.
2

As set forth in Wells' initial brief, although Jensen told
officers where the contraband drugs could be found and "took" them to the
drug locations, there is no evidence that she or Wells consented to a
search of those areas. Evidence of consent must include clear and
positive testimony that consent was unequivocal, specific, and freely and
intelligently given, without duress or coercion, express or implied.
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), aff 'd. 853 P.2d 898
(Utah 1993); U.S. v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1973) (action in
pointing to area where drug package was kept did not constitute consent) .
The record in this case contains no evidence whatsoever that officers
requested or obtained consent to conduct the search. Rather, the record
reflects that Jensen disclosed the location of the cocaine in response
to the officers' questions. See State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah
1983), where admitting to growing marijuana does not mean defendant has
consented to a search for it.
4

vicinity of Wells' and Jensen's arrests.

In fact, the officers did

not conduct a "search" per se; they simply went to the jacket and
vacuum cleaner to seize drugs.

The trial court summed up the

evidence and challenge to the search as follows:
What's being challenged is once the defendant was in
custody, that is, handcuffed and in custody, what was it
that then would allow or authorize the officers to go the
step further of going into another location in the home
to seize the drugs in question?
(R. 143.)

The state's case lacks evidence concerning "immediate

control," and the proximity in time between the arrest and search.
Thus the "incident to arrest" exception is an improper basis for
affirming the judgment in this matter.3
A. THE STATE'S LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT WELLS
WAS IN "IMMEDIATE CONTROL" OF THE JACKET AND VACUUM
CLEANER REFUTES THE DETERMINATION THAT THE SEARCH WAS
INCIDENT TO ARREST.
The state bears the burden of proving that the presumptively
unreasonable search of the jacket and vacuum cleaner was valid
under both the federal and state constitutions.4

Thus, the state

3

The state incorrectly asserts that the trial court justified the
"limited and contemporaneous" search of the vacuum cleaner and jacket as
"incident to defendant's warrant-supported arrest on drug related
charges." (Appellee's Brief at 6.) The phrase "incident to arrest" is
found in the record in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Denying Motion to Suppress Evidence, which were prepared by the state
("Findings and Conclusions"). The Findings and Conclusions state (i)
officers interrogated Jensen "incident to arrest" (R. 112) and (ii) under
certain "exigent circumstances" warrant and warrantless arrests and
searches "incident to arrest" are justified. (R. 113.) Although the
trial court ultimately and erroneously determined "exigent circumstances"
existed in this case, it did not validate the search of the jacket and
vacuum cleaner as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest.
4

See Katz v. Unites States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Pavton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (warrantless searches and seizures
inside the home are presumptively unreasonable); State v. Gardiner, 814
P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1991) (recognizing warrantless searches are per se
5

was required to present to the trial court evidence concerning the
area of "immediate control" to justify the search of those areas as
incident to Wells' arrest.

Where the state fails to present clear

evidence to rebut the presumption, the warrantless search cannot be
justified.

See State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Utah Ct. App.

1990) ("This court cannot properly determine the outcome of a fact
sensitive issue where the record below is not clear"). 5
1. A Search Incident to Arrest Is Restricted to the Room
Where Officers Arrested the Defendant.
In the context of the "incident to arrest" exception, the
Supreme Court in Chime 1, 3 95 U.S. at 763, construed the phrase
"area within [the arrestee's] immediate control" as follows:
[T] he area from within which he might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence.
There is no comparable justification, however, for
routinely searching any room other than that in which an
arrest occurs -- or, for that matter, for searching
through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed

unreasonable under Art. I, sec. 14 of the Utah Constitution);State v.
Harrison, 805 P. 2d 769, 784 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (burden is on the state
to justify the search); State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1290-91 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
5

In the trial court the prosecutor apparently recognized that the
evidence was not sufficiently clear to rebut the presumption (R. 88-89),
and identified "additional particulars" allegedly relevant to the search
in an effort to provide clarity. Although the prosecutor's "additional
particulars" do not constitute evidence and in part are not supported by
the record, they reflect that the state has believed, until now, that
certain circumstances existed placing the search of the vacuum cleaner
and jacket beyond the pale demarcated by Chime1 and its progeny.
Specifically, the prosecutor acknowledged that upon entering the premises
the officers arrested Wells in a hallway and contemporaneous therewith
conducted the sweep search; then officers arrested Jensen in the "baby's
bedroom," secured her and moved her to "the larger masterbedroom." (R.
89.) Contrary to the state's assertions on appeal, the search of the
vacuum cleaner and jacket occurred after the sweep search and in rooms
other than where Jensen and Wells were arrested. The state appears to
have raised the "incident to arrest" exception on appeal as part of a
last-minute shift in tactics.
6

areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence
of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the
authority of a search warrant.
Id.

In this matter officers searched through closed and concealed

areas:

the lining of the jacket and the vacuum cleaner.

No "well-

recognized" exceptions authorize such a search.
In addition, the officers searched areas in rooms "other than
[those] in which the arrest[s] occurred." (R. 65 (officers arrested
Wells at the bottom of the stairs near basement apartment entry),
R. 14 8 (officers found Jensen in closet in "back room" and arrested
her), R. 150-51 (Russo located vacuum cleaner in living room), and
R. 53 (Jensen "took" officers to jacket on "a bed" in a separate
room).)

The warrantless search for evidence was not justified by

any recognized exception and was therefore contrary to the Fourth
Amendment.

See State v. Austin, 584 P. 2d 853, 856

(Utah 1978)

(search restricted to single room where defendant arrested); State
v. Farnsworth, 519 P.2d 244, 246

(Utah 1974)

("It

is not to be

doubted that when an accused is under arrest and in custody, a
search made elsewhere would not ordinarily be justified as incident
to the arrest"); State v. Cox, 200 N.W.2d 305, 309
(search limited to bedroom were defendant arrested)

(Minn. 1972)
(cited with

approval in Austin, 584 P.2d at 856); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32
N.Y.2d 499, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 799, 300 N.E.2d 139, cert, denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973) (cited with approval in Austin, 584 P.2d at
856) .

The officers7 seizure of drugs from closed and concealed

areas in rooms other than where the arrests of Jensen and Wells
occurred renders the search and seizure unconstitutional.
7

See

State v.

Johnston,

645

P. 2d

63

(Wash. Ct. App.

1982)

(after

defendant's arrest in office, officers' warrantless search of purse
found in closet was unconstitutional).
2.
Police Cannot Circumvent the Fourth Amendment by
Escorting the Arrestee to Other Rooms in the House in
Order to Conduct a Search Incident to Arrest.
The state makes the ambiguous and meaningless assertion that
Wells was

"within several feet" of the jacket; therefore, the

jacket was "within an area" of "immediate control."
Brief at 9.)

(Appellee's

Since Wells and Jensen were not arrested in the rooms

where the searched items were located, the distance of "several
feet" must be as the crow flies, failing to take into consideration
the walls and rooms between Wells, Jensen, and the items.
If the state is suggesting Wells was in the rooms where the
items and/or Jensen were located, the necessary inference is that
officers escorted Wells to those areas in order to search the
specifically identified items as incident to Wells' arrest.

Such

a warrantless search is unconstitutional.
In U.S. v.

Rothman, 492

F.2d

1260

(9th Cir.

1973),

the

defendant was arrested as he was about to board an airplane and was
taken to a room at the airport, after which his checked luggage was
retrieved from the plane and brought to the office where he was in
custody. Officers searched the luggage in defendant's presence and
confiscated evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit ruled the search was not incident to the arrest: "The
police cannot circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
by arresting a person and then bringing that person into contact
8

with his possessions which are otherwise unrelated to the arrest."
Id. at 1266; see also Shipley, 395 U.S. at 820 (the constitution
has never been construed to allow the police, in the absence of an
emergency, to arrest a person in one location and then take him to
another

location

for the purpose

of

conducting

search); U.S. v. Wright, 577 F.2d 378

a

warrantless

(6th Cir. 1978); U.S. v.

Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Of course, Chimel,
does not permit the arresting officers to lead the accused from
place to place and use his presence in each location to justify a
'search incident to the arrest'").
3 . The Fact that Wells Owned the Jacket Does Not Per Se
Validate the Search as Incident to Arrest.
The

state

has

cited

to

a

number

of

cases

"uphold [ing]

contemporaneous searches of an arrestee's clothing" as incident to
arrest, as though such a search is per se reasonable.

(Appellee's

Brief at 9-10.) However, the cases cited by the state focus on the
"immediate control" factor and are factually distinguishable from
this matter.

In State v. Parker, 337 S.E.2d 487 (N.C. 1985), the

court upheld the search of the defendant's jacket as incident to
arrest where the defendant was three or four feet from it and made
a motion in front of officers toward it.

"Additionally, when the

defendant was taken to the sheriff's department he was allowed to
wear the jacket."
In

Id. at 489.

Commonwealth

v.

Wheat ley,

402

A.2d

1047

(Pa.

1978),

officers obtained a warrant to search the defendant's premises
based on probable cause that his house-mate was dealing in heroin.
When officers executed the warrant, they found defendant at the
9

kitchen entrance, drug paraphernalia on the kitchen table, and
defendant's jacket in front of him on the back of a kitchen chair.
It appeared to the officers that the defendant and house-mate had
been "shooting up."

Id. at 1048-49.

They arrested defendant on

drug charges, searched the defendant's jacket and confiscated a
handgun, which resulted in firearms charges against him.

On appeal

the court upheld the search on the basis that the jacket was
sufficiently under the control of the house-mate and therefore
permissible

as part

of

the

search

conducted

pursuant

to

the

warrant, and as incident to arrest.
The court

in State v. LeBlanc, 347 A. 2d 590

(Me. 1975),

recognized that a search incident to arrest must be limited to the
area where the arrest occurred.

The police in that case were

called to an apartment where "strange goings on" were reported.
When they arrived, they observed what appeared to be a burglary in
progress,

entered

identification.

the

apartment

and

asked

He refused to cooperate.

the

defendant

for

Because the officers

believed they had interrupted a burglary, an officer went directly
to the defendant's jacket for information concerning his identity
or status as a burglar.

The jacket was in defendant's full view,

8 to 10 feet away, and within his immediate control.

In upholding

the search the court stated:
Regardless of this officer's subjective purpose, a
reasonable
and
prudent
police
officer
in
these
circumstances would have been justified in searching the
area within which this still unrestrained defendant might
obtain a weapon or destroy evidence of the crime of which
the police had probable cause to believe him guilty.
Id. at 595.
10

In People v. Lvda, 327 N.E.2d 494

(111.Ct.App. 1975), the

court upheld the search of the arrestee's jacket, which was hanging
on a peg across the room.

The arrest took place in a public area

and the jacket, which belonged to defendant, could not be left
behind.

Thus, it was searched before it was returned to defendant.

The state also cites to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981), as governing a residential search incident to arrest.

In

that case, a single officer engaged in a high speed chase, overtook
the vehicle and four passengers, pulled the vehicle over, ordered
its occupants out of the car, observed evidence of marijuana in
plain view, arrested the four occupants, and searched them and the
vehicle

contemporaneous

to the arrest.

Id. at

455-56.

The

contemporaneous search yielded cocaine in Belton's jacket, and he
moved to suppress it as evidence.

On appeal, the United States

Supreme Court upheld the search and adopted a bright-line test for
automobile searches incident to arrest:
[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of
that automobile.
Id. at 460. The Court cautioned that its ruling "does no more than
determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular
problematic

context,"

thereby

signaling

the

and

bright-line

rule

applies only in the context of vehicular searches and does not
apply in the context of searching residential premises.

Belton,

453 U.S. at 460; see also State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied. Case No. 960094 (Utah April 23,
1996) (citing Belton as putting an end to confusion under Fourth
11

Amendment surrounding search of automobiles

incident to arrest).

The facts and inferences in this case lack the indicia of
"immediate control" identified in the cases cited by the state.
Among other things, officers did not observe the jacket or vacuum
cleaner in the rooms where the arrests occurred, they did not
observe Wells motioning or lunging toward the objects, and they did
not search the objects for objective purposes to check identification or so that Wells could take the items with him to the police
station.6

"Rather, the search had been made in order to find

narcotics, which were in fact found."

Chime1, 3 95 U.S. at 763.

4.
The Area of "Immediate Control" Was Severely
Restricted Where Wells and Jensen Were in Handcuffs and
in the Custody of Four Officers.
The state claims that the fact that Wells was in custody,
arrested and handcuffed during the search of the vacuum cleaner and
jacket is irrelevant. (Appellee's Brief at 10.)

Yet those factors

are important in assessing two circumstances of the search: control
and exigencies.

The precise circumstance of the incident must be

evaluated in determining the area within those premises which may
be said to be within the arrestee's immediate control. Austin, 584
P.2d at 856 (the effect of putting handcuffs on the arrestee is a

6

Russo testified that sufficient time lapsed, between the time
Wells ran downstairs to the time officers arrested him at the bottom of
the stairs, to permit Wells to hide cocaine in the jacket and marijuana
in the vacuum. (R. 52.) Such speculation is not sufficient to satisfy
the "exigent circumstances" factor. See U.S. v. Salgado, 807 F.2d 603,
609 (7th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988) (the possibility
without more that evidence will be destroyed if police take the time to
obtain a warrant is insufficient to justify conduct). Even if Wells hid
the drugs in that brief time period, it is unclear how Jensen knew to
tell officers where the drugs were located since she was hiding in a
closet. Further, the drugs were not in danger of being destroyed.
12

factor in determining the necessity for the search); U.S. v. Lyons,
706 F.2d 321, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (the court must ask whether the
area in question, was "conceivably accessible to the arrestee -assuming that he was neither 'an acrobat

[nor] a Houdini'?"); 3

Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.3(c), 303-06 (3d ed. 1996).
The

fact that

an arrestee was

in handcuffs

supports

the

determination that the search of the nearby area was not within his
immediate control.

See U.S. v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 570 (8th

Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 499 U.S. 938 (1991) (search was

illegal

under incident to arrest doctrine where handcuffed suspect was
unable to access briefcase); U.S. v. Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954, 956
(10th Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103, 105 (10th Cir. 1969),
cert, denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971); U.S. v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056,
1062 (5th Cir. 1980).
In addition, because Wells and Jensen were taken into custody
by four officers, the area of possible reach and control was
considerably limited.

It was unlikely Wells and Jensen could get

by four officers in order to gain access to and control over the
jacket and vacuum cleaner in other rooms.

See State v. Ricks, 816

P. 2d 125 (Alaska 1991) (defendant would have to get by two officers
to get to his jacket placing it out of his "immediate control");
People v. Bishop, 377 N.E.2d 585, 588 (111. Ct. App. 1987); State
v. Cook, 332 S.E.2d 147, 154-55

(W.Va. 1985)

(search of top of

dresser improper after 2 of 3 arrestees handcuffed and all 3 seated
on bed with shotguns pointed at them) ; U.S. v. Hill, 73 0 F.2d 1163,
1167-68 (8th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984) (three
officers in immediate area surrounding defendant restricted area of
13

"immediate control"); U.S. v. Mapp. 476 F.2d 67, 79-80
1973) .

(2d Cir.

The state has failed to satisfy the "immediate control"

factor in this case.
With respect to the exigency factor, officers in this matter
never

articulated

evidence

concerns

for

safety

or

the preservation

of

(Appellee's Brief at 15 ("no deputy expressly testified

that he was concerned for his safety")).

To the extent the facts

imply such concerns existed at the time of the arrests, officers
put them to rest with a sweep search that left them empty-handed
and assured them "the house was empty."

(R. 66.)

The officers'

search should have ended there, as set forth in Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325 (1990):
[A]s an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a
precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces
immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an
attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts which,
taken together with the rational inferences from those
facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual
posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. This is no
more and no less than was required in Terry and Long, and
as in those cases, we think this balance is the proper
one.
We should emphasize that such a protective sweep, aimed
at protecting the arresting officers, if justified by the
circumstances, is nevertheless not a full search of the
premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of
those spaces where a person may be found.
The sweep
lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than
it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.
Id. at 335-36.

In this matter, sometime after the arrests officers

went

to the vacuum

directly

evidence, plain and simple.

cleaner

and

jacket

to

confiscate

Since officers had already assured

14

themselves during the sweep search that the house was empty, an
additional search of other areas of the house was unjustified.
permit

otherwise

would

render

the

protections

of

the

To

Fourth

Amendment as articulated in Chime1 and Buie a nullity.
B. THE STATE HAS NO EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PROXIMITY IN
TIME BETWEEN THE SEARCH AND THE ARREST.
The state presented no evidence in the trial court to support
a determination that the search was closely related in time to
Wells 7

and/or Jensen's arrests.

This Court has held in Fourth

Amendment cases concerning warrantless searches incident to arrest
that the search must be a contemporaneous incident of the arrest to
be valid.

State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1245; State v. Harrison,

805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991) (contemporaneous to arrest, a diaper
bag was searched).
search was made.

The record in this case reflects only that the
Where the state fails to present evidence to

rebut the presumption that the warrantless search was unreasonable,
it cannot be justified.

See Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253.

C. THE STATE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES ADDED PROTECTION FROM
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY POLICE.
Art. I, sec. 14 of the Utah Constitution is identical in part
to the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution, but is given
more force.

See State v. Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460, 465-68

(Utah

1990); accord. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1991);
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-17 (Utah 1991) .7 As a result
7

The majority of the Utah Supreme Court has supported at various
times analyzing Art. I, sec. 14 in a manner separate from the Fourth
Amendment in order to provide the citizens of Utah with greater,
15

of "some of the confusing exceptions to the warrant requirement
that have been developed by federal law in recent years," Larocco,
794 P. 2d at 4 69, the Utah Supreme Court has adhered to the "concept
of expectation of privacy as a suitable threshold criterion for
determining whether article I, section 14 is applicable.
article

I,

section

permitted only
namely,

Although

applies,

where they satisfy

to protect

the destruction

14

the safety

their

of police

of evidence.11
Larocco

warrantless

concerns

searches

traditional
or the public

Then if
will

be

justification,
or to

prevent

Id. at 469-70.
the

automobile, the same if not greater

warrantless
"threshold

search

of

criterion"

an
and

"traditional justifications" must apply before a warrantless search

predictable protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See
Justice Durham's plurality opinion in Larocco, 794 P. 2d at 461, 473,
joined by Chief Justice Zimmerman; Chief Justice Zimmerman's concurring
opinion in State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1239 (Utah 1996) ("I must
point out that the lead opinion's directive to Utah courts to construe
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution in a manner similar to
constructions of the Fourth Amendment except in compelling circumstances
is not supported by a majority of this court and is not Utah law . . .
[I] fault the lead opinion for blindly adhering to federal precedent on
this [search and seizure] issue"); and Justice Howe's lead opinion in
Thompson, 810 P. 2d at 416 (interpreting Article I, section 14 to provide
greater protections against unreasonable searches and seizures than
federal counterpart). Associate Chief Justice Stewart concurred in the
result in Larocco, but provided no insight into his rationale. See State
v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 536 (Utah 1994). Notwithstanding, Associate
Chief Justice Stewart embraces the court's responsibility to
independently interpret Utah constitutional provisions:
If this Court were to view its constitutional duty to construe the
provisions in the Utah Declaration of Rights in the exact same
manner as the United States Supreme Court construes analogous
provisions in the Bill of Rights, we would violate the spirit and
intended effect of Utah constitutional law and policy as established
by the framers of the Utah Constitution.
Anderson, 910 P. 2d at 1240. But see id. at 1235 (Justice Russon:
"Although we are obligated to provide a state law review, such an
independent analysis is not necessarily a different
analysis").
16

of a home will be upheld.

" [T] here is a significant difference

between an exigent circumstances analysis involving an automobile
and one involving a private residence. In their own homes, citizens
enjoy a 'heightened expectation of privacy.'"

State v. South, 885

P.2d 795, 799 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
To that end, and as a preface to Larocco, Chief
Zimmerman

suggested

the

following

in

considering

Justice

warrantless

searches of premises:
One way to improve [the contradictory and confusing
rationalizations and distinctions under federal law]
might be to sharply limit the sweep of exceptions to the
warrant requirement that often raise questions of police
overreaching. In their place, clear-cut rules could be
adopted -- for example, a flat requirement that a warrant
must be obtained before any non-consensual search of
property not in the immediate physical control of a
suspect is conducted.
Such a rule would be an
improvement over present law, both for the individual and
for the police. The individual would be assured that, in
most cases, his property would not be searched or seized
unless the reasons for the search or seizure have first
been presented to a neutral magistrate and a warrant
issued. At the same time, police officers would not be
forced to speculate about what may or may not be subject
to search without a warrant. Warrantless searches would
be permitted only where they satisfy their traditional
justification - - t o protect the safety of officers or to
prevent the destruction of evidence. Once the threat
that the suspect will injure the officers with concealed
weapons or will destroy evidence is gone, there is no
persuasive reason why the officers cannot take the time
to secure a warrant. Such a requirement would present
little impediment to police investigations, especially in
light of the ease with which warrants can be obtained
under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A., 1953, §
77-23-4(2).
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d

264, 272

(Utah 1985)

(Zimmerman,

J.,

concurring) (footnotes and cites omitted).
Art. I, sec. 14 is the principal protection under the Utah
Constitution against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings.
17

At a minimum, the state must be required to show that probable
cause and articulable exigent circumstances existed at the time of
the search to justify the conduct.8

See State v. Northrup, 756

P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . " [T] he need for an immediate
search must be apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh
the important protection of individual
warrant requirement."

rights provided by the

State v. South, 885 P. 2d 795, 799 (Utah Ct.

App. 1994) (quoting State v. Beavers, 859 P. 2d 9, 18 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) .
Other

states

have

rejected

federal

cases

developing

the

"incident to arrest" exception under the Fourth Amendment, and have
ruled that under state constitutional provisions, officers must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts that an exigency
existed

to support a warrantless

Barrett, 701 P.2d 1277, 1281

search.

See also. State v.

(Haw. 1985); People v. Qokev, 457

N.E.2d 723, 724-25 (N.Y. 1983) (marijuana recovered from arrestee's
bag was suppressed

in the absence of exigent circumstances to

justify search).
The evidence before this Court refutes, among other things,
the existence of an articulable exigency at the time

8

of

the

search

The warrantless search exception articulated under Art. I, sec.
14 is different from the federal "incident to arrest" exception in at
least one basic respect: the federal exception takes into consideration
the probable cause and exigent circumstances existing at the time of the
arrest.
Notwithstanding the difference, the exception under Art. I, sec.
14 satisfies police concerns for safety and the preservation of evidence,
while simplifying the confusion developed under the federal "incident to
arrest" analysis, where courts justify a search even when handcuffs are
firmly fastened on the defendant, who has been removed from the
automobile or to some distant part of the room or house, and there is no
likelihood that the defendant will reach the area in question.
18

as mandated by Larocco.
18-24.)

(See Appellant's Brief, dated 2/28/96, at

Thus, even if the search may be justified under the

federal constitution as reasonable, there is no persuasive reason
why, under Art. I, sec. 14, the officers could not have taken the
time to secure a warrant.
POINT 11 . THE STATE FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE "EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES" TO JUSTIFY THE SEARCH UNDER THE SEPARATE
"PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES" EXCEPTION.
The state next claims that Wells' challenge to the search
under

the

"exigent

circumstances"

exception

fails

for

three

reasons: (1) Wells allegedly failed to marshal Russo's testimony
and the trial court's express finding "that the deputies were not
able to determine

that no

[Jensen]

remained

in

arrests"

(Appellee's Brief at 13-14);

the

individuals
apartment

other than

until

sometime

[Wells]

and

after

the

(2) exigencies existed to

justify the forced entry and arrest (id. at 14) ; and (3) "deputies
were reasonably concerned for the possible destruction of suspected
narcotics" (id. at 15).
With respect to the first point, the trial court's "express
finding" is not supported by Russo's testimony, which reflects that
a sweep search was conducted immediately after Wells was arrested
and cuffed.9

The state completely disregards that evidence.

9

Even

According to Russo, the sweep search was conducted immediately
after the officers arrested Wells:
ATD [Counsel for Wells] : Who was in the room when [Wells] was
arrested? Cuffed?
A [Russo]: Those three additional officers.
ATD: Okay. And was [Jensen] already cuffed by then?
A:
[Wells] was cuffed first and [Jensen] was in the back
room. So probably no.
19

if officers waited to make the sweep search until sometime after
the arrests, as suggested by the state, they could not use that
search to confiscate drugs from the jacket and vacuum cleaner.

The

protective sweep would be aimed only at protecting the arresting
officers, Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-36; it is unreasonable to infer
that officers believed the jacket and vacuum cleaner were "spaces
where a person may be found."

Id.

With regard to the second point, the circumstances leading up
to the arrest are irrelevant since the probable cause and exigent
circumstances exception takes into account the circumstances at the

ATD: So as far as you know he was in handcuffs as soon as you
could get him in handcuffs . . .?
A: Yes.
ATD: . . . upon making entry?
A: Yes.
ATD: There wasn't any stopping to chit chat, or look for
anything, or look around.
A: No. We had to gas the dog because the dog bit Sterner.
ATD: And other than that -- was he in handcuffs at the time
the dog bit?
A: No, we were trying to get to him.
ATD: Okay. So immediately after the dog bite, that's when he
gets cuffed?
A: Yes.
ATD: Okay. And there wasn't anybody else in that entire
house, correct?
A: Yes.
ATD: At that time?
A: Correct.
ATD: The house was empty.
A: Correct.
(R. 65-66.) In addition, the trial court examined Russo on that point:
THE COURT: Deputy Russo, there was an indication when you
made entrance into the home that it was subsequently
determined that the home contained only two occupants, those
who were arrested?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: When was the determination that those were the
only two occupants of the home made, before or after the
defendant was placed in handcuffs?
THE WITNESS: After.
(R. 164.)
20

time of the search.

See State v. South, 885 P.2d 795, 798-99 (Utah

Ct. App. 1994) (considering probable cause factor in conjunction
with

search);

State v.

Clark,

654

P.2d

355, 360

(Haw.

1982)

(considerations relate to search).
In order to justify a warrantless search under that exception,
the circumstances must lead officers to conclude that there is no
time to obtain a search warrant.
effected the arrest warrants.

In this case officers had already

Consequently, the events leading up

to and ending with the execution of those warrants (Wells fleeing
downstairs

while

pulling

something

from

his

pocket;

deputies

requesting entry and breaking glass door; the attack by the dog and
subsequent
irrelevant.

gassing

of

the

dog

prior

to

Wells'

arrest)

are

In addition, the officers conducted a sweep search.

Thus, the execution of the arrest warrant and the subsequent sweep
search insulate the prior "exigencies" from the second, subsequent,
warrantless search of discreet areas.

See U.S. v. Irizarry, 673

F.2d 554, 559 (1st Cir. 1982) (after defendants were arrested and
a security sweep of room had been completed, no further exigency
justified search of area above drop ceiling in bathroom); Finch v.
State, 592 P.2d

1196

N.Y.S.2d

52, 56-57,

arrested

defendant

(Alaska 1979); Kwok T. v. Mauriello, 401
371 N.E.2d

and had

814

(1977)

information

(after police

concerning

had

location of

evidence, police had no reason to believe evidence would be removed
or destroyed prior to obtaining a warrant).

Once Wells and Jensen

were arrested there was no persuasive reason why the officers could
not take the time to secure a warrant.
21

With regard to the third point, as acknowledged by the state,
nothing

in the record

supports the determination

that

exigent

circumstances existed (Appellee's Brief at 15). In fact, officers
conducted a sweep search to placate safety concerns. With respect
to the destruction of evidence, unlike the agents in State v. Ashe,
745 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Utah 1987), officers in this matter did not
hear "the sound of a flushing toilet," Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1260,
leading

them

to believe

suspected narcotics."

"defendant

was

attempting

(Appellee's Brief at 15.)

to

destroy

Since the "goods

ultimately seized were not in the process of destruction," the
search on that basis cannot be justified.
U.S. 30, 35

(1970) .

Vale v. Louisiana, 399

The state has failed to identify exigent

circumstances to rebut the presumption that the warrantless search
was unreasonable.
POINT III. WELLS PROPERLY PRESERVED AND HAS PROPERLY
RAISED IN THIS APPEAL THE ISSUE OF THE OFFICERS' ABILITY
TO OBTAIN A WARRANT IN DETERMINING THE UNREASONABLENESS
OF THE SEARCH.
Finally, the state asserts Wells did not sufficiently raise
the issue concerning the officers' failure to show they were unable
to obtain a telephonic search warrant.

(Appellee's Brief at 16.)

The state claims that the issue was "only nominally challenged" in
a

footnote,

when

in

fact

trial

counsel

applicable to obtaining telephonic warrants

identified

Utah

law

(R. 43 and 45) , and

argued during the hearing on the pre-trial Motion to Suppress that
under the circumstances officers "could have easily secured the
area and done a telephonic search warrant, let a magistrate decide
22

if [probable cause existed]."

(R. 141.)

The state has overlooked the issues raised in the record, and
has overstated the breadth and purpose of the waiver doctrine:
The requirement of a specific objection on the record
ensures that the trial court will understand the basis of
the objections and have an opportunity to correct any
errors before the case goes to the jury.
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16

(Utah 1988); Utah County v.

Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983) ("[I]n order to preserve a plea
of error, the alleged error must have been raised seasonably by
counsel to the trial court
correct

any

error,

if

. . .

error

to allow the trial court to

there

be 11 );

Wurst

v.

Dep't

of

Employment Sec., 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (issue
sufficiently raised where mentioned in letter to department which
served as appeal of A.L.J.'s decision).
In this case, the preservation concerns have been served.

The

trial court was apprised of the fact that officers failed to seek
the issuance of a warrant via telephone and of the need to have a
magistrate decide the issues. The trial court also was apprised of
Utah law bearing on that issue.

The trial court was given the

opportunity to rule on the matter and ruled that the Motion to
Suppress was denied.

The issues surrounding the state's failure to

obtain a search warrant via telephone were not raised "for the
first time in this Court" as asserted by the state.
Brief at 17.)

(Appellee's

While the basis for requiring such a warrant was not

spelled out in the same manner as on appeal, the issues were clear
and obvious: The telephonic search warrant provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 77-23-4(2) (1993) renumbered as § 77-23-204(2) (1995) were
23

available to and should have been utilized by the officers in order
that a magistrate could determine whether a search warrant could be
issued in accordance with the federal and state constitutions. (R.
43, 45, 141.)
search warrant.

The officers failed to seek issuance of a such
The matter must now be resolved on appeal.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Wells respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the Motion to Suppress.
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